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2I.  INTRODUCTION
America is currently facing an imminent disaster which the vast majority of its citizens 
are entirely unaware of.  This disaster has nothing to do with militant terrorist organizations.  It 
likewise does not involve an impending worldwide shortage of fossil fuels.  Nor does it entail the 
potential development of nuclear weapons in hostile nations.  Rather, this disaster exists much 
closer to home.   America is presently facing an impending shortage of productive agricultural 
land.  For many years, governments at every level have allowed unplanned, rapid-fire, 
speculative development to occur virtually unrestrained in every area of this country.  This 
development is occurring almost exclusively on productive agricultural land.  The result: 
America’s most productive agricultural lands are quickly being replaced with strip malls, 
apartment complexes, and shopping centers—in other words, suburban sprawl.  This widespread 
conversion of agricultural land is pervasive, and it is a disaster that is swiftly reaching a 
crescendo.  
The citizens of this nation are currently experiencing a very different state of affairs than 
our forefathers were accustomed to.  At the time of this country’s founding, Thomas Jefferson 
envisioned America as a nation built of small communities, each organized around subsistence 
farming.  Agriculture was to be the cornerstone of the nation’s economy.  Jefferson’s vison is 
quite obviously archaic in comparison to modern corporate America.  Yet, most contemporary 
Americans would likely scoff at the notion that the country is now facing an imminent shortage 
of agricultural land.  However, this is the reality of the situation currently facing this nation. At 
current rates, all of America’s  productive agricultural land will be gone in a little over two 
hundred years.  This country’s agricultural land has quite literally become endangered.  
3Moreover, the rate at which this nation’s productive agricultural land is developed and 
converted to other uses continues to increase, due to a wide variety of factors.  Much of 
America’s most productive agricultural land is located in immediate proximity to urban areas.  
Thus, as urban areas continue their natural expansion, this prime agricultural land is situated 
directly in the path of encroaching development.  In addition, the market for development has 
operated for years in such a way that the long term consequences of land conversion are not 
properly accounted for.  This is because the demand for development continues to escalate at a 
rate that exceeds localities’ ability to plan for the resulting growth.  Rather than adjust their land 
use planning schemes to effectively balance competing interests, the majority of states have 
simply allowed the market to dictate the pace and manner of development.  Expansion thus 
occurs in an unplanned, scattered fashion, and productive agricultural land is therefore frequently 
replaced with suburban sprawl.  Governments on both a national and state level have long been 
aware of this phenomenon, yet have not come close to reaching a solution to it.  Sprawl and 
agglomeration threaten to devour the most productive agricultural land in America, and as of 
today there exists no settled strategy to stem the flow.  
Yet, this is not a problem that is inherently incapable of solution.  The federal 
government and state and local governments possess all of the powers and land use planning 
tools necessary to accomplish the task, but have not yet fashioned a proper remedy.  The answer 
lies in organization and implementation.  The efforts of governments at all levels must be 
coordinated to assist in the development and implementation of a comprehensive land use 
planning model.  The rapid nation-wide conversion of prime agricultural land can only be 
effectively managed by a comprehensive land use planning model that is flexible enough to 
allow development and preservation to complement one another, and sufficiently elastic that it 
4can be adapted to suit the unique needs of each state.  While productive agricultural land is being 
converted to suburban sprawl in every state in America, no single scheme is capable of 
uniformly solving the problem.  Rather, states need a model that can be altered as needed to 
account for the differences among localities while still reaching the same end result.  Thus, the 
goal of this Article is to lay the groundwork for the development of a model that incorporates 
various land use planning tools in a way that will allow localities to properly balance competing 
interests to ensure that development occurs in an intelligent, well-planned manner, and that 
agricultural lands are not unnecessarily sacrificed.  
Part II of this Article provides detailed statistical evidence proving that productive 
agricultural land is being developed and converted to suburban sprawl in every state and locality 
in America.  Part II also demonstrates that, because of market pressures and the general location 
of America’s most productive agricultural land, the rate at which agricultural land is being
developed and converted to other uses continues to escalate.  In addition, an account of the 
problems resulting from this phenomenon is provided, as well a description of the benefits of 
agricultural land—both economic and otherwise.  Part III discusses land use planning programs 
implemented by both the federal government and state and local governments, concluding that 
the measures currently being utilized are insufficient to adequately balance the competing 
interests of development and agricultural land preservation.  Part IV considers the legal 
implications of a comprehensive land use planning model, with particular emphasis placed on 
Fifth Amendment “takings” challenges to the implementation of land use restrictions such as 
agricultural zoning.  Finally, Part V provides suggestions for the development of a 
comprehensive land use planning model.  Part V proposes a framework to coordinate the 
respective efforts and capabilities of the federal government, state and local governments, and 
5even private organizations, to assist with the implementation of a land use planning scheme 
designed to preserve America’s productive and valuable agricultural land while ensuring that 
development proceeds in an intelligent fashion. In addition to suggesting a framework for 
governmental organization, Part V provides a detailed example of the manner in which various 
land use planning tools can be deployed as part of a comprehensive land use planning scheme 
that can be adapted to account for differences among states and localities while achieving 
uniform results.  
II.  THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PRODUCTIVE AGRICULTURAL LAND AND SUBURBAN SPRAWL
Urban expansion is irrevocably changing the landscape of America.  While the migration 
of America’s populace to urban areas—and the growth of urban areas—has been a dominant 
social trend for decades, the rate of urbanization has increased dramatically in recent years.  
Between 1982 and 1997 the population of the United States grew by seventeen percent, but the 
amount of urbanized land in America increased by forty-seven percent.1 Current estimates place 
the amount of land being developed in America each year at two million acres.2  Most of this 
land is productive agricultural land; “conservative” estimates place the amount of productive 
agricultural land developed each year at approximately one million acres.3 Currently, two acres 
1 See American Farmland Trust, Farming on the Edge: Major Findings, at
http://www.farmland.org/farmingontheedge/major_findings.htm [hereinafter Major National Findings] (discussing 
population growth in relation to urbanization).
2
 David C. Levy & Rachael P. Melliar-Smith, The Race for the Future: Farmland Preservation Tools, 18 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 15 (2003).
3 See David L. Szlanfucht, How to Save America’s Depleting Supply of Farmland, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 336 
(1999).  However, it should be noted that some studies have found that the average annual loss of agricultural land 
to other uses to be much higher.  For example, Luther Tweeten estimates that agricultural land in America is 
converted to other uses at a rate of four million acres annually.  See Luther Tweeten, Food Security and Farmland 
Preservation, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 237, 240 (1998) (discussing average annual loss of agricultural land between 
1945 and 1992).  
6of productive agricultural land are developed and converted to other uses each minute.4  At this 
rate, all of the agricultural land in America will be exhausted by the year 2225.5  However, this 
land will likely be lost much sooner because the rate at which agricultural land is being 
developed and converted to other uses continues to increase.  Agricultural land was developed 
fifty-one percent faster during the 1990s than during the 1980s.6 Of this land, the most 
productive land is being lost more quickly; the rate of conversion for prime agricultural land
between 1992 and 1997 was thirty-one percent higher than for non-prime agricultural land.7
This escalation is unlikely to slow because for the majority of America’s most productive 
farmland is directly in the path of development.  Eighty-six percent of the fruits and vegetables 
and sixty-three percent of the dairy products produced in the United States are produced on 
agricultural land located immediately contiguous to urban areas.8  In fact, “fewer than one-fifth 
of rural counties in North America now have a significant economic dependence on farming.”9
Therefore, the majority of America’s prime agricultural land is perfectly situated for 
development.  As urban areas expand, America’s most productive agricultural land will continue 
to be converted to other uses.  
Moreover, the rate at which agricultural land in areas adjacent to urban centers is 
developed will continue to increase as a function of the market.  Many American consumers 
desire to build homes on large lots, which are often unavailable (at least at an affordable price) in 
metropolitan areas.10  In addition, “the high cost of housing in major cities and coastal 
4
 Major National Findings, supra note 1.
5 See Tweeten, supra note 3, at 240.  
6
 Major National Findings, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9
 John W. Keller, The Importance of Rural Development in the 21st Century – Persistence, Sustainability, and 
Futures, at http://www.law.du.edu/rmlui/HotTopics/Keller2000ImportanceofRuralDevelopment.htm.
10 See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Agricultural Zoning: Impacts and Future Directions, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 419, 441 
(2002) (noting that suburban sprawl exists because it “is what a significant number of consumers want”); Major 
7environments” drives many people to search for homes in outlying areas.11 Therefore, 
consumers create an escalating demand for the development of land contiguous to urban areas.12
Because America’s most productive agricultural land is located near urban areas, this land 
provides the supply.  Therefore, developers naturally focus on the productive agricultural land 
surrounding America’s urban centers as they respond to consumers’ demand.  Developers also 
have a more basic reason to develop and convert agricultural land to other uses: farmland is 
particularly attractive because it is flat, well-drained, and therefore easily converted to 
commercial, industrial, or residential purposes.13 As Chicago journalist Robert Heuer points out, 
“historically, planners’ bread and butter has been planting subdivisions on farmland.”14
The significant effect of normal market pressures on the pace of development is 
exacerbated by the fact that local governments in outlying areas either ignore the fact that 
agricultural land is being developed and converted to other uses or even encourage it.  For 
example, local governments often promote land development as an economic policy because
they believe that development will increase the tax base.15 Quite often, these pressures combine 
National Findings, supra note 1 (“[S]ince 1994, 10+ acre housing lots have accounted for 55 percent of the land 
developed.”).
11
 Levy, supra note 2, at 15.  
12
 Many other factors that contribute to consumers’ demand for the development of agricultural land have been 
noted.  For example, telecommunications have had an increasing impact in recent years.  Developments in 
telecommunications are “releasing households from location constraints related to maximum acceptable time and 
distance.”  Keller, supra note 9.  Because people are not nearly as bound by location as they were in the past, people 
consider a wider range of options when making housing choices, and more frequently choose to live further away 
from city centers.  Id.  
13 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing trend in which developers replace productive farmland with 
urban sprawl); Guadalupe T. Luna, “Agricultural Underdogs” and International Agreements: The Legal Context of 
Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy, 26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 51 (noting underlying rationale for developers’ 
attraction to rural areas).
14
 Tom Daniels & Deborah Bowers, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA’S FARMS AND FARMLAND 34-
35 (Island Press 1997) [hereinafter HOLDING OUR GROUND]. 
15 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 442 (discussing governmental subsidization of scattered development, “especially in 
terms of roads”); Levy, supra note 2, at 17 (“Cash-strapped local governments must, therefore, rely on sales tax and 
other revenues from commercial development to fund their operations.  This leads to a competition for development, 
often at the expense of prime agricultural land . . . .”).  This frequently occurs in spite of the fact that fiscal costs due 
to service provision demands actually outweigh revenue generation on developed land.  See infra at notes 35-40 and 
accompanying text.  
8to produce land development and conversion at a greater pace than local governments can 
reasonably plan for.16  Before a local government realizes what is occurring and implements a 
proper land use planning scheme to deal with the development, the conversion of the locality’s 
agricultural land to other uses is already well under way.  Thus, the development and conversion 
of agricultural land often proceeds solely as a function of the market.  The result is that land 
development in such areas is frequently accomplished in a scatter-shot, unplanned manner.17 In 
other words, America’s most productive agricultural land, situated in close proximity to large 
urban centers, is being replaced with suburban sprawl.18 “Traditional rural communities lying 
within 65 to 120 kilometers of the metropolitan fringe show a strong propensity to expand . . . . 
[creating] quite possibl[y] the final wave of spatial development of large urban centers before 
urban agglomeration occurs.”19
This phenomenon is not in any manner localized, for productive agricultural land is being 
developed and converted to other uses at an increasing rate in nearly every state in America.  For 
example, Atlanta has been referred to as “the most sprawl-threatened region in the United 
States,” based on the fact that the area surrounding the city loses an average of 2,000 acres of 
agricultural land to other uses each month.20  Texas is currently the most sprawl-threatened state 
in the nation,21 having had 332,800 acres of prime agricultural land developed and converted to 
16 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that development is often typified by “high demand, low costs, 
and the absence of developmental oversight by local governments”).
17 See id.; Cordes, supra note 10, at 441-42.  
18 According to Cordes, while the concept of suburban sprawl is appalling to most Americans in the abstract, the 
market does not permit this problem to self-correct.  See id. (“[C]onsumer preferences . . . fail to consider the 
broader social costs of their actions and thus leads to an inefficient allocation of resources.   The market, as reflected 
in consumer choices, fails to consider all the costs and benefits in a transaction; they are external to the 
decisionmaking process.”).  
19
 Keller, supra note 9.  Keller notes that the current trend in many urban areas is “emptiness at the center and 
growth on the edges.”  Id.    
20 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing urban sprawl in Atlanta); Neil R. Pierce, Urban Sprawl 
Increasingly a Political Issue, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 12, 1998, at 26 (describing suburban sprawl and resulting 
problems).
21 See Major National Findings, supra note 1.
9other uses between 1992 and 1997 (a forty-two percent increase from the previous five years).22
Even less populous states are not immune to this phenomenon.  For example, 17,800 acres of 
prime agricultural land were developed and converted to other uses in Utah between 1992 and 
1997 (a forty-eight percent increase from the previous five years).23
The negative consequences of such rapid-fire, unplanned development and conversion of 
prime agricultural land are numerous.  As an initial matter, America’s most productive 
agricultural land is no longer available to provide valuable resources necessary for the country’s 
general welfare.  Another equally obvious consequence is that the natural beauty and open space 
that once existed are now permanently obliterated.  The widespread expansion of public services 
such as sewer systems and roads—necessary to support the newly developed land—not only
promotes additional conversion and sprawl,24 but also frequently destroys entire ecosystems and 
without exception contributes to rising levels of pollution.25 Additionally, the subdivisions and 
strip malls that typify suburban sprawl often leave behind blight and poverty in inner cities as the 
populace becomes concentrated on the urban fringe.26 Nor is such development beneficial for 
many of the communities in which agricultural land is being converted to other uses.  For 
example, market and governmental forces exert such pressure in favor of development that
22
 American Farmland Trust, Farming on the Edge: Major Findings, at
http://www.farmland.org/farmingontheedge/major_allstates.htm [hereinafter Major State Findings].
23 Id.  This trend is unlikely to ebb, for Utah’s population increased by more than ten percent between 1995 and 
2000.  See Levy, supra note 2, at 15.
24 See James H. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model for State Growth 
Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 495 (1994).  See also Neil D. Hamilton, Plowing New 
Ground: Emerging Policy Issues In A Changing Agriculture, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 181, 192 (1997) (“While those 
roads may now be lined with bountiful farms, the nearby growth and installation of services, such as sewer and 
water, means that in five years most of those farms will no longer exist.”); HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 
50 (“Civilization follows the sewer line.”).  
25 See Patrick J. Skelley, Defending the Frontier (Again): Rural Communities, Leapfrog Development, and Reverse 
Exclusionary Zoning, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J.  273, 287 (1997).  See also Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341 (“This trend 
increases the rate of stormwater runoff, which in turn increases the flow of pollutants to discharge areas including 
rivers and streams.”).
26 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 340 (discussing how suburban sprawl “accelerates the decline and 
deterioration” of urban areas); see also Keller, supra note 9 (discussing growth of the urban fringe).
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agricultural land is often converted to residential use before the necessary infrastructure is in 
place.27 Thus, many home-buyers moving to such areas are rewarded with “soaring property tax 
rates” imposed by local governments to cover the costs of necessary public services.28  Such 
consequences turn the forces in favor of development on their respective heads and beg the 
question: when does development, especially development accomplished in an unplanned 
manner, become a detriment to society?
Even if one ignores the many negative consequences of suburban sprawl and urban 
agglomeration, agricultural land merits strong protection from a land use planning perspective 
because of the numerous benefits it provides.  America’s agricultural land “provide[s] much of 
the nation’s food and fiber and has a significant impact on the U.S. economy.”29 Preserving 
America’s prime agricultural land results in reduced prices for produce generally; because 
America is not reliant on foreign produce, the prices of foreign produce are driven down, 
resulting in the competitive pricing of both local and imported goods.30 Thus, agricultural land 
provides a tremendous benefit to the nation’s welfare,31 a benefit that decreases corresponding to 
the increasing rate at which agricultural land is developed and converted.  
In addition, and contrary to popular belief, protecting agricultural land rather than 
allowing it to be developed and converted to other uses can be economically beneficial to 
27 See James Poradek, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan Land-use Planning: Private Enforcement of Urban 
Sprawl Control Laws, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1997).
28
 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 341.
29
 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 338.  See also Steven C. Bahls, Preservation of Family Farms: The Way Ahead, 45 
DRAKE L. REV. 311, 322-25 (1997) (discussing society’s interest in protecting safety of its food).
30 See, e.g., Anthony R. Arcaro, Avoiding Constitutional Challenges to Farmland Preservation Legislation, 24 
GONZ. L. REV. 475, 495 (1988-89) (“[C]heaper local produce helps keep down the cost of imported farm products . . 
.”).  
31
 While agricultural land protection measures on the national level have largely been unsuccessful to date, see infra
notes 43-77 and accompanying text (discussing failure of agricultural land protection measures imposed by federal 
government), the federal government has recognized the importance of agricultural land to the nation’s welfare for 
many years.  For example, the preamble to the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 states that “the maintenance of the 
family farm system of agriculture is essential to the social well being of the Nation” and that farming is “essential to 
. . . the competitive production of adequate supplies of food and fiber.”  Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. 
No. 97-98 § 1608 Stat. 1213, 1347 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §2266 (1994)).   
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localities as well.  As discussed previously, the market generally sets a trend in favor of 
increased development and conversion.32  However, the market for land development is 
inefficient because many of the actors (consumers, developers, and local governments) suffer 
from an information deficiency.33  The market for agricultural land conversion often places so 
much pressure on these actors in favor of development that all of the costs and benefits cannot be 
properly weighed.34  Thus, development frequently proceeds in an ad hoc and unplanned fashion.
As a result, most state and local governments are unaware of the extent to which agricultural 
land contributes to the economy.  Agricultural land actually helps subsidize local governments 
because it provides greater revenue in the form of property taxes than it requires in public 
services.35  For example, studies conducted by the American Farmland Trust demonstrate that 
agricultural land requires only $0.21 to $0.75 in public services for every dollar it generates in 
property tax revenues.36  In comparison, residential land requires $1.05 to $1.67 in public 
services for every dollar generated in property tax revenues.37  Thus, while “farmland protection 
is fiscally responsible . . . residential growth does not pay its own way.”38  Moreover, while 
commercial and industrial land uses generally provide more in tax revenue than they demand in 
public services,39 they also result in suburban sprawl because they “encourage residential growth 
and development, whereas farms do not.”40 In addition, commercial farms provide good 
investment opportunities, supply jobs, raise a large amount of income, and contribute to the tax 
32 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 441 (discussing consistent market trend in favor of development).
33 See, e.g., id. at 441-42 (discussing inefficiency in market for development).
34 See id.
35 See Sean F. Nolan Cozota Solloway, Note and Comment, Preserving Our Heritage: Tools to Cultivate 
Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACE L. REV. 591, 640 (1997); Holly L. Thomas, DUTCHESS 
COUNTY PLANNING DEP’T, TECH MEMO: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF LAND CONSERVATION 1 (1991).
36 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 55.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 339.
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base—all while demanding few public services expenditures by local governments.  Given all of 
these benefits, seldom considered because of market pressures, state and local governments
should recognize that “promoting local agriculture is a form of economic development.”41
Accordingly, state and local governments should include agricultural land preservation as a 
ubiquitous component of their land use planning schemes.  
In summary, current statistics demonstrate that America’s prime agricultural land is being 
developed and converted to other uses at an increasing rate nationwide.  The conversion of this 
nation’s most productive agricultural land into suburban sprawl and urban agglomeration is 
unlikely to yield, for the majority of such land is directly in the path of development and current 
market pressures favor development and conversion.  Yet, America’s agricultural land is a 
valuable resource that provides a benefit, a benefit which is non-renewable once these lands are 
developed and converted.  Accordingly, a comprehensive land use planning model is needed, one 
that adequately accounts for the need to preserve this valuable resource while still allowing 
development to occur in a controlled fashion.  The fact that agricultural land continues to be 
converted at increasing rates demonstrates that current measures are failing.  If a viable solution 
is not soon discovered, “the last crop produced on much of the nation’s prime farmland will be 
asphalt.”42
III.   A MODEL OF INEFFECTIVENESS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAND USE PLANNING SCHEMES
As the preceding Section demonstrates, America is in dire need of a solution to the 
increasing development and conversion of prime agricultural land.  Obviously, the programs 
41 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 17 (emphasis added).
42
 Solloway, supra note 35, at 595.
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enacted to date have not successfully addressed this problem, for productive agricultural land is 
being developed and converted to other uses in an unplanned, unintelligent manner at increasing 
rates nationwide.  Indeed, it is widely recognized that most programs developed ostensibly to 
protect agricultural land have proven ineffective.43 A new land use planning model is needed, 
one that includes the preservation of agricultural land as a major component  yet is 
comprehensive enough to account for the factors that contribute to agricultural land conversion 
in various localities.  In devising such a plan, it is appropriate to first consider the actions that 
have already been taken by both national and state governments.  While no government has 
enacted a comprehensive land use planning scheme capable of solving this problem, the failings 
of previously enacted plans should inform any discussion of the proper way to engage in 
comprehensive land use planning.  Progress can never be made when the mistakes of the past are 
not considered and addressed.  Accordingly, the following Sections examine actions taken by 
national and state governments, respectively, to protect agricultural land.
A.  Federal Protection for Agricultural Land
The federal government has been passing legislation dealing with agricultural land for 
many years.  For example, during the New Deal the federal government passed a wide array of 
agricultural legislation—legislation providing for, among other things, widespread subsidy 
programs, rehabilitation loans, and government land purchases.44 However, the escalating rates 
of agricultural land conversion and suburban sprawl have stimulated a growing national 
43 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 335 (“[M]any of the enacted programs to protect farmland have proven to be 
largely ineffective.”).
44 See Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America, Briefly, 26 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 
73, 74-75 (2005).   
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awareness of the problems associated with these trends in recent years.  This awareness has 
forced the federal government to pay increased attention to the problems by passing legislation 
purporting to address these important land use issues.45 As early as 1975, the Committee on 
Land Use for the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) recommended that steps be 
taken to maximize the retention of agricultural land.46 In the years since, the federal government 
has passed legislation enacting many programs supposedly designed to stimulate the protection 
and preservation of agricultural land.47  However, the federal government has traditionally
viewed land use matters in general—and land use planning schemes in particular—as matters of 
local concern.48  Accordingly, the approach taken by the federal government has largely been 
one of abstention, whereby specific programs are designed to incentivize the private sector to 
protect agricultural land.  However, these programs are not deployed as any sort of 
comprehensive land use planning strategy.49 In fact, most federal programs enacted to date have 
been “little more than token attempts at farmland protection.”50 In contrast, over ninety federal 
spending programs have a significant effect on the location and cost of private development, but 
do surprisingly little to regulate or supervise the industry’s impact on agricultural land.  For 
45
 This Section deals only with legislation purportedly designed to directly protect and preserve agricultural land, 
and thus does not discuss other federal programs that impact agricultural land, such as federal subsidy programs.  It 
should be noted that federal subsidy programs suffer from the same failings as the rest of the federal legislation, for 
they are not deployed as part of a coordinated national land use program.  Id. at 80.  
46 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 75.  
47
 This section is in no way meant to be a comprehensive list of federal legislation relating to agricultural land and 
suburban sprawl.  While Congress has frequently passed legislation that purportedly addresses the depletion of 
agricultural lands, few of the enacted programs have been successful.  See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 
76.  Therefore, this section will only address the more significant legislative programs.  For a more comprehensive 
discussion of federal legislation dealing with this issue, see Levy, supra note 2, at 15-18 and HOLDING OUR 
GROUND, supra note 14, at 75-85.   
48
 The federal government has come remarkably close to adopting a national land use planning program on two 
separate occasions: during the New Deal and again during the 1970s.  See Wildermuth, supra note 44, at 75-78.  
Both times, the proposed program failed miserably.  Id.  Wildermuth describes the federal government’s current 
strategy with regard to land use planning as “piecemeal.”  Id. at 73.
49 See, e.g., HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 75 (“[T]he federal government has nothing close to a coherent 
strategy to protect farmland.” (emphasis added)).  
50 Id. at 76.
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example, the federal highway program increases access to outlying areas and thus promotes 
suburban sprawl.  Because the federal government has taken surprisingly few steps to coordinate 
its various programs, the result is that the federal government has, in effect, helped “subsidize[ ]
the conversion of millions of acres in farmland over the past fifty years.”51 While the vast 
majority of federal legislation has done little to curtail the rapid development of agricultural land, 
several programs are worth noting, if more for their failings than for their successes.  
In 1981 Congress passed the Farmland Protection Policy Act52 (“FPPA”) after a study of 
the nation’s agricultural lands demonstrated that a large amount of productive agricultural land 
had been developed and converted to other uses between 1967 and 1977.53  The goal of the 
FPPA was to reduce federal contribution to agricultural land depletion by forcing fe deral 
agencies to coordinate their administration of federal programs with agricultural land 
preservation policies and programs administered by state and local governments.54 Under the 
FPPA, a federal agency is required to submit a Farmland Conversion Rating Form to the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service whenever a federally funded project will contribute to farmland 
conversion.55  These reports serve as the basis for a yearly presentation that the USDA gives to 
Congress regarding “the impacts of federal programs and projects on farmland conversion.”56
However, this reporting scheme serves as little more than an information gathering vehicle for 
Congress.  Because the FPPA does not require that federal agencies actually take any action to 
minimize the impact of federal programs on the conversion of agricultural land, federal agencies 
51 Id.
52
 Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1341 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 
1451 (1994)).
53 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 76.
54 Id. at 76-77.  
55 Id. at 77.
56 Id.
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may proceed to administer their programs as they like. 57  Accordingly, the only real benefit of 
the reporting requirement is transparency, which amounts to little more than a “bland 
acknowledgement of concern, setting forth a very limited role for the federal government” in 
land use planning.58
However, the FPPA does contain one distinct benefit: the creation of a land evaluation 
and site assessment (“LESA”) system.59  The LESA is a statistical rating system that attempts to 
objectively rate the quality and productivity of agricultural land on a numerical basis.60 The 
objective of the LESA system is to gather data that will assist state and local governments in 
identifying prime agricultural land for preservation.61 However, the federal LESA system suffers 
from a serious shortcoming in that the rating of agricultural land is generally lowered (and thus 
deemed less worthy of protection) as surrounding developmental pressures increase.62 Thus, 
under the federal LESA system, the rating of America’s most productive farmland—the vast 
majority of which is located near large urban areas—is artificially deflated.  For example, highly 
productive agricultural land in areas such as California’s Central Valley receives a low rating 
under the federal LESA system despite being some of the most productive agricultural land in 
the entire United States. 63 Despite its failings, however, the federal LESA system has been put 
57 Id.
58
 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 334.
59
 It should be noted that the LESA system is not the first information gathering system to be organized at the federal 
level.  During the New Deal, the USDA organized a land use reporting system that transmitted data from the county 
level to the federal government, although the approach was much less sophisticated.  See, e.g., Wildermuth, supra
note 44, at 75 (describing data collection system during the New Deal “designed to serve as conduits of data and 
policy-making from the grassroots to the USDA”).  
60 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 77.
61 See, e.g.,  id. at 77-81 (describing federal LESA system and its uses).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 81.
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to use as a land use planning mechanism in a majority of states; by 1996, the system was being
used in over thirty states.64
Following its initial attempt to preserve agricultural land with the FPPA, Congress 
enacted the 1985 Farm Bill a few years later.65  This legislation was designed to promote the 
preservation of agricultural land by providing an incentive for private landowners to establish 
conservation easements on their land.66  The Bill accomplished this through a debt-reduction-for-
easement provision that empowered the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”)  “to reduce the debt 
obligation of farmers who donate a conservation easement on their nonproductive land to the 
agency.”67 However, the program was almost a complete failure, as virtually no landowners 
chose to enroll with the FSA.  While over 66,000 agricultural landowners had contacted the 
agency to attempt to have their debt reduced as of 1989, only approximately 400 actually 
expressed a desire to be considered for the program.68
Congress has also passed several acts designed to either grant or lend federal funds to 
states for use in protecting agricultural lands.  For example, in 1990 Congress passed the Farms 
for the Future Act (“FFA”).69 The FFA enacted a “purchase of development rights” (“PDR”) 
program, whereby the federal government would lend federal money to states to be used to 
purchase the development rights on privately-owned agricultural land.70  Under the FFA, the 
federal government allocated up to ten million dollars in federal money per year to be lent to 
64 Id.
65
 1985 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354.
66 Id.
67 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 81.
68 Id.
69
 Farms for the Future Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3616 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1401 
(1991)).
70 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 82.  PDR programs are discussed in further depth infra at notes 
138-40 and accompanying text.
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states willing to match half of the federal funds.71  The FFA was replaced six years later when 
Congress upped the ante by passing the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 
1996 (“FAIR”).72 FAIR replaced the lending approach of the FFA by simply allocating federal
grant money for states with dedicated farmland preservation programs to use to purchase 
conservation easements on privately-owned agricultural land.73 The program, known as the 
Farmland Protection Program, allocated thirty-five million dollars in federal grant money to be 
used to purchase such easements.74  However, the program had very limited success and was 
shortly repealed.75  FAIR was then replaced by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
200276 (“FSRIA”), which does little more than update FAIR and signal a return to the fund-
matching nature of the FSA.77  Under the FSRIA, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized “to 
purchase land or conservation easements for the purpose of protecting topsoil by limiting 
nonagricultural uses of the land.”78  The purchases are accomplished by the USDA partnering
with state and local governments as well as nongovernmental organizations to provide up to half 
of the fair market value for such easements.79  Thus, as with the FSA, the FSRIA only requires 
the federal government to provide half of the funds for conservation easements.
Two major flaws exist regarding all of the legislation described above, supposedly 
designed to increase the preservation of productive agricultural land.  First, the federal 
government has done remarkably little to ensure that its legislative programs function as part of a 
71 Id.
72
 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 972 (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 5678 (1996)).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75
 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 335 (stating that FAIR contained “minor but encouraging efforts . . .  to preserve 
farmland.”).
76
 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002). 
77 See Levy, supra note 2, at 16.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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comprehensive land use planning program designed to preserve agricultural land.  Instead, the 
federal government has passed legislation that functions in isolation, legislation that merely 
provides incentives for private landowners to refrain from developing their agricultural land.
These incentive schemes usually contain only one “tool” to do the job, such as a PDR program or 
a fund-matching program designed to purchase conservation easements.  Such schemes are
woefully inadequate to combat the pervasive market pressures to develop agricultural land which 
exist on a state and local level.  Because “states, and particularly local governments . . . 
implement[ ] the majority of land use controls,”80 simply providing funding is not sufficient in 
localities that do not approach land use planning in any sort of reasoned manner, for the trend in 
favor of development is so prevalent that simply placing conservation easements on land in a 
haphazard manner may do little good.  While “the federal funding role for farmland preservation 
is likely to expand . . . as the squeeze on farmland resources continues,”81 Congress’ funding 
programs would be much more successful in preserving productive agricultural land if they were 
deployed as merely one piece of a comprehensive land use planning model.
Second, most of the federal legislation enacted to date employs the very most expensive 
land use planning tools, which are unlikely to prevent America’s most productive agricultural 
land from being converted to other uses.  The FFA, FAIR, and FSRIA all employ either PDR or 
conservation easement programs, and all use federal funds—either exclusively or in combination 
with state funds—to purchase development rights from private landowners.  The problem with 
such legislative schemes is that the most productive agricultural land in the country is located 
near urban areas, and is likely to have a high fair market value.  Therefore, funds used to 
purchase development rights to such land do not go very far.  Moreover, landowners in such 
80 Id. at 15.
81 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 83.
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areas may be reluctant to sell the development rights to their land once the fair market value 
reaches a certain point.  For example, if a landowner can sell his land outright at $50,000 per 
acre, or sell only the development rights at $25,000 per acre, the decision may be a foregone 
conclusion.  The bottom line is that when only these limited land use planning tools are 
employed, very little is actually accomplished in the way of protecting America’s most 
productive agricultural land.  To the extent these tools are deployed, Congress needs to take steps 
to ensure that their impact is maximized.  Again, if these programs were implemented a part of a 
comprehensive land use planning model, Congress would get much more bang for its buck.  
Otherwise, the impact of federal legislation will continue to be minimal.   
B.  State and Local Protection for Agricultural Land
Nearly all substantive programs designed to protect agricultural land are currently 
implemented at a state or local level. 82 The federal government certainly has an important role 
to play in effective land use planning, particularly from an organizational perspective.  However, 
many land use planning measures are necessarily implemented by state and local governments, 
for many land use planning “tools” are not readily accessible to the federal government.83 As the 
conversion of agricultural land has become an increasingly relevant issue in recent years, more 
and more state and local governments have begun implementing various programs designed to 
protect their productive agricultural land.  In fact, every state currently has in place some form of 
82 See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 4 at 335 (“As a result of both Congress’ apparent inability to preserve farmland 
and current prevailing national sentiment, the difficult task of preserving farmland has been left primarily to the state 
legislatures and local government.”).
83
 For example, zoning schemes are frequently deployed in efforts to balance needs for both development and 
preservation.  Because zoning schemes do not lend themselves particularly well to oversight on a national level, they 
are necessarily implemented by state and local governments.  
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legislation designed to protect and preserve agricultural land, although the level of protection 
varies wildly from state to state.84
While every state has implemented some sort of program designed to protect agricultural 
land, “[m]ost states have not done a good job of coordinating these techniques into a strategic 
package,”85 which explains in part the increasing rate of farmland conversion.  Even Oregon’s 
land use planning program, widely hailed as the most successful in the nation and imitated by 
several states,86 has not been entirely successful; Oregon’s agricultural land continues to be 
converted at increasing rates despite the fact that Oregon has the most comprehensive land use 
planning model in the nation.87  Therefore, while farmland conversion has been recognized as a 
concern in every state, there currently exists no universally recognized solution to the problem.  
This Section discusses a variety of land use planning techniques implemented by state and local 
governments, addressing both the positive and negative aspects of each.  It also discusses 
Oregon’s land use planning model in depth, pointing out the various techniques used by Oregon 
on both a state and local level and addressing the problems Oregon has encountered in 
administering its comprehensive land use planning scheme.
1.  Land Use Planning “Tools” for State and Local Governments
A wide variety of land use planning techniques are currently being utilized by state and 
local governments to protect and preserve agricultural land.  To begin with, every state now 
offers a favorable property tax program designed to allow agricultural land to be taxed according 
84 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.  See also Cordes, supra note 10, at 420 (“All levels of government 
have perceived farmland preservation as an important societal goal . . . .”).
85 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.  
86 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 352.
87 See Major National Findings, supra note 1.
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to its value as agricultural land, rather than its fair market value.88 For example, agricultural land 
in Utah is taxed “according to its use value”89 under the Farmland Assessment Act (“FAA”).90
The FAA was enacted because, as is the case in many states, “urban growth was encroaching on 
rural areas and . . . if farmland was taxed at market value, farmers . . . would find it difficult to 
continue to devote their property to low-profit farming operations.”91  This is typical of the 
situation facing agricultural land in many states.  Because most productive agricultural land is 
located near urban areas, it is likely to have a much higher fair market value than agricultural 
land in rural localities.  If agricultural land in urban localities is taxed at its fair market value 
rather than according to its current use, the taxes are likely to be exponentially higher.  When this 
occurs, agricultural land owners may be forced to sell their land to developers simply because, as 
a result of the tax scheme, it is not financially efficient to continue to use the land for agricultural 
production.
While property tax programs designed to benefit owners of agricultural land do tend to 
decrease developmental pressure, they are inherently capable of manipulation when not 
employed along with other land use planning techniques as part of a comprehensive plan to 
protect agricultural land.  It is not at all uncommon for developers to purchase agricultural land, 
maintain it for a period of time as agricultural land to benefit from the favorable tax scheme, and 
then develop and convert it to other uses.  For example, in Utah the FAA permits landowners a 
tax deduction for agricultural use when a parcel of land is five acres or larger and meets the other 
requirements in the act regarding agricultural production.92  In Board of Equalization of Salt 
88 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.  
89 County Bd. Of Equalization Wasatch County v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 2000 UT 57 ¶ 10, 6 P.3d 
559 (Utah 2000).
90
 Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-501 to -515 (2003).
91 County Bd. Of Equalization Wasatch County, 2000 UT 57 ¶ 10, 6 P.3d at 562.  
92 UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-503 (2003).
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Lake County v. Utah State Tax Com’n ex rel. Judd,93 the Utah Supreme Court considered the 
application of the FAA to a parcel of agricultural land that had been subdivided for development 
and sale, yet maintained as agricultural land until development began in order to qualify for the 
tax exemption.94  Though the court noted that such a use did “not comport” with the intent of the
statute and stated that the FAA effectively created a “tax loophole” for developers, the court 
allowed the tax deduction because it technically comported with the statute.95
Every state has also enacted some form of a “right-to-farm” law, which helps protect 
agricultural landowners operating in areas contiguous to urban or suburban areas from private 
nuisance suits.96 In general, right-to-farm laws protect agricultural landowners by limiting the 
circumstances under which neighboring landowners can bring a cause of action based on 
nuisance.97  For example, an agricultural landowner may need to fertilize his fields in the spring.  
Fertilization frequently causes unpleasant odors, which neighboring landowners may want to 
prevent.  However, in localities with right-to-farm laws, the neighboring landowners would 
likely be unable to maintain a nuisance suit to enjoin the agricultural landowner from fertilizing.  
Thus, right-to-farm laws have the effect of sparing agricultural landowners from incurring costly 
litigation expenses in such suits.
93
 846 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1993).
94 Id. at 1296-97.
95 Id. at 1297.  Developers’ manipulation of tax schemes intended to benefit agricultural land is becoming an 
increasingly common method of keeping the cost of property low pending sale for development.  For another clear 
example of a farmland tax program being manipulated, see SKS Property, LLC v. Multnomah County Assessor, 2003 
WL 22319429 (Or. Tax Magistrate Div. 2003).  In SKS Property, the plaintiff grew vegetables on a six acre parcel 
of property until the property sold in order to qualify for a special assessment only available for agricultural land.  
Id. at 1.  The court upheld the special assessment under the terms of the statute at issue.  Id. at 4.  The lesson from 
these cases is that courts are often constrained to interpret these types of statutes literally, even when the application 
of the statute is clearly counter to its purpose.  When tax schemes that are supposed to benefit agricultural land are 
not implemented as part of a greater plan to protect and preserve agricultural land, the result is frequently the 
creation of a tax loophole for developers and increasing developmental pressure.
96 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.  
97 Id.
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While favorable tax schemes and right-to-farm laws are employed by every state in 
America, other land use planning tools are not as pervasive.  The extent to which agricultural 
land is protected and the variety of tools that are employed to do so varies wildly from state to 
state.  Perhaps the most important land use planning tool is the agricultural zoning scheme, along 
with its many variants and complementary programs.  Every state utilizes some sort of zoning 
scheme to classify various categories of land and define the uses to which a parcel of land may 
be put in each category.  For example, land may be zoned for commercial, residential, or 
agricultural use, with these categories often divided into subcategories to delineate various uses 
within each category.  In general, agricultural zoning schemes “impose restrictions on the 
amount and type of development” that may occur within the zone, thereby preventing the land 
from being converted to other uses.98  Agricultural zoning schemes have become the “most 
widely used means by which municipalities restrict development and preserve farmland,”99 and 
are now “the foundation of most farmland preservation efforts.”100  As of 1997, twenty-six states 
utilized agricultural zoning in some form.101
In general, there are two major types of agricultural zoning schemes: exclusive and non-
exclusive agricultural zoning, the latter being the most popular.  An exclusive agricultural zoning 
scheme typically “prohibits any use of the land other than agricultural,” although “compatible or 
accessory buildings” are usually allowed.102  Because exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are 
98
 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 348.  
99 Id.; see also HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 106 (“Agricultural zoning is the most common land-use 
technique for limiting the development of farmland.”); Jerome E. Rose, Farmland Preservation Policy and 
Programs, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 591, 600 (1984) (discussing prevalence of agricultural zoning to protect 
farmland).
100
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 422.
101 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 88.
102
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 423.  In Oregon, where exclusive agricultural zoning is used extensively, accessory 
uses are often protected as fiercely as primary agricultural lands.  For example, in Eugene Sand & Gravel v. Lane 
County, 74 P.3d 1085 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the county’s consideration of a farm 
stand as an accessory use in denying the defendant’s rezoning request in an exclusive farm use area.  Id. at 1092.  
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so restrictive, they are very rarely used, usually only when “farming is the dominant land use, the 
farmland is in large contiguous blocks, and there are few nonfarm dwellings or other nonfarm 
buildings in the area.”103  Because it is usually applied to large areas of land, exclusive 
agricultural zoning “avoids the problem of leapfrog and buckshot development,” or suburban 
sprawl.104  Thus, exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are highly effective land use control 
devices when it comes to simply preserving productive agricultural land.  However, they also run 
a high risk of provoking litigation—particularly Fifth Amendment “takings” challenges105—
when applied to areas with any sort of non-agricultural development already in place because 
they are so restrictive.  Few states have used exclusive agricultural zoning schemes, although 
Hawaii, Oregon, and Wisconsin have successfully introduced them as part of their state land use 
planning models.106
In contrast with exclusive agricultural zoning schemes, non-exclusive agricultural zoning 
schemes allow land within the zoned area to be used for non-agricultural purposes, though 
agricultural use is usually encouraged and stimulated by the particular structure of the scheme.107
When properly used, non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are extremely effective in 
balancing competing interests, particularly between development and preservation.  Because of 
their flexibility, these schemes are used much more widely than exclusive agricultural zoning 
schemes.  
The court held that the farm stand was an “agricultural use,” and therefore it was proper for the county to consider 
the effects of rezoning, including increased traffic, dust, and lost resources, on the farm stand.  Id. at 1086. 
103 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 115.
104 Id.
105
 Takings challenges are discussed at length in relation to land use planning tools infra at notes 160-94 and 
accompanying text.
106 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 115.  See also Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 352-53 (discussing 
Oregon’s statewide farmland preservation program).
107
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 423.  
26
Non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are implemented in a variety of ways.  For 
example, many state and local governments preserve agricultural land by implementing large 
minimum lot size restrictions.108  These restrictions are usually tailored to correspond to the 
minimum size of parcels of agricultural land in the area.109  This is a particularly popular 
technique because the size restrictions can be changed gradually as needed to allow development 
to proceed in an orderly and planned fashion.110  Another approach often utilized in non-
exclusive agricultural zones is to allow land to be developed more intensely based on the size of 
the parcel.  This is usually accomplished by the implementation of a “sliding-scale” agricultural 
zone, “which decreases the dwellings per acre as the acreage goes up.”111  For example, a 
sliding-scale zone might permit one dwelling for the first five acres, two for the first twenty, and 
so on.  The effect is to “permit[ ] greater residential development for smaller parcels,”112 which 
are more likely to have passed into the residential or commercial land market due to their size 
and decreased profitability.  Another form of area-based allocation is the fixed-area allocation, 
which is a simple allocation of building rights according to acreage.113  For example, in a zone 
which allowed one dwelling per twenty-five acres, a landowner who owned 100 acres could 
build four dwellings.
Non-exclusive agricultural zoning schemes also frequently employ buffer zones to 
concentrate development in certain areas within the broader agricultural zone.  This is often 
accomplished through “cluster zoning,” “which establishes overall density restrictions . . . but 
permits small lot ‘clustering’ of actual development on the property.”114  For example, in an 
108 See id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. 
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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agricultural zone with a twenty-five acre minimum lot size a landowner with 100 acres would be 
entitled to four dwellings, but permitted to “cluster” them in a corner of the property to and 
preserve the rest of the property as open agricultural space.  Most often utilized in suburban 
settings, critics argue that cluster zoning can lead to conflicts with non-farming neighbors, 
fragmentation of farmland, and an atmosphere of impermanence.115  A more popular approach is 
to simply create an intermediate buffer zone between areas zoned for agricultural and residential 
or commercial use.  Though zoned as agricultural, a buffer zone usually has a smaller minimum 
lot size requirement, such as five or ten acres.  In essence, a buffer zone creates a transitional 
boundary between agricultural and residential or commercial land.  This has the advantage of 
planning for future development while still preserving prime agricultural land because 
development can proceed outside the agricultural zone and eventually proceed to the buffer zone 
when the locality deems it appropriate.  
A distinction must be drawn between a buffer zone implemented within an agricultural 
zoning scheme and an urban growth boundary (“UGB”).  A UGB is, “in essence, a line drawn 
beyond which development will be prohibited, thus directing growth pressure inward instead of 
sprawling out.”116 In comparison to a transitional buffer zone, a UGB simply establishes a set 
boundary between agriculturally zoned land and land zoned for other uses.  UGBs are most often 
used in areas immediately contiguous to developed land, thus preserving the areas beyond.
Because of this, UGB areas tend to experience a great deal of market pressure from the abutting 
urban land.  As a result, local governments may feel heightened pressure to grant variances to 
allow parcels of land within the agricultural zone to be used for other purposes, and eventually to 
rezone the agricultural land entirely. 
115 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 122-23.
116
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 424.  See also HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 133-44 (providing a 
comprehensive discussion of UGBs).  
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Agricultural zoning has become the most common land use planning tool used to protect 
agricultural land because it offers “several distinct advantages”117 over other land use control 
devices.  Because zoning in general is “a familiar and widely used land use control 
mechanism,”118 most people recognize and understand zoning on some level, which is likely to 
lead to greater acceptance.  In addition, agricultural zoning schemes “restrict[ ] a landowner’s 
own decision to convert the property to more intensive uses, thus avoiding the limitations of 
voluntary programs,” such as conservation easements.119  Agricultural zoning schemes are also 
inexpensive in relation to other land use control devices120 because the cost of preservation is 
placed on individual landowners—by eliminating development opportunities and restricting land 
to agricultural use, agricultural zoning “shift[s] the cost of farmland preservation from society as 
a whole to landowners themselves.”121 Thus, agricultural zoning defuses, to an extent, the most
prevalent factor influencing the conversion of productive agricultural land: market demand.  
Agricultural zoning is particularly effective in defusing market pressures to develop if a 
locality is successful in zoning a large area of land for agricultural use.122  Localities can 
preserve their most productive land, creating a “critical mass” to “keep individual farmers from 
becoming isolated islands in a sea of residential neighborhoods.”123  This helps “limit land 
speculation, which drives up the fair market value of farm and ranch land,” and also helps 
reinforce the concept of “agriculture as a long-term, economically viable activity, instead of an 
117
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 422.
118 Id.
119 Id.  Voluntary land use preservation tools are discussed in further depth infra at notes 138-42 and accompanying 
text.
120
 For example, PDR programs use taxpayer money to purchase development rights from owners of agricultural 
land.  See, e.g., Szlanfucht, supra note 4 at 345-48 (discussing PDR programs).  These programs are discussed in 
further depth infra at notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
121 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 435.
122 See, e.g., id. at 445 (agricultural zoning schemes are “able to quickly preserve large tracts of contiguous land for 
farming, creating an assurance of insulation and stability for [the] future”).
123
 American Farmland Trust: Farmland Information Center, Agricultural Protection Zoning Fact Sheet at
http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/tas/tafs-apz.html [hereinafter “Farmland Information”].
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interim land use.”124   When a large amount of agricultural land is preserved, agricultural zoning 
“keep[s] land prices down and reduce[s] the pressure to sell for the higher development 
value.”125  In addition, landowners are less likely to find themselves embroiled in nuisance suits, 
for they are less likely to be surrounded “by neighbors who are offended by noxious farm odors 
and chemical spraying.”126 A properly implemented agricultural zoning scheme also “helps 
promote orderly growth by preventing sprawl into rural areas.”127  In short, agricultural zoning 
schemes can be an extremely effective land use planning tool in protecting agricultural land, 
promoting organized development, and preventing uncontrolled sprawl.
Despite their many advantages, agricultural zoning schemes are not without their
problems.  Agricultural zoning “is not a permanent measure to preserve farmland because 
rezonings can occur by a vote of the local legislature.”128  Because the character and disposition 
of localities are never a constant, land that is zoned for agricultural use may be rezoned once 
citizens who want to sell their land at a higher developmental value garner enough support to 
prompt a rezoning.  This is especially problematic given that those who have their land zoned for 
agricultural use often perceive as unfair the placement of societal preservation costs on a few 
landowners.129 Because land zoned for agricultural use is likely to be less valuable than 
developable land, agricultural zoning may remove equity and credit values from the land, 
reducing the amount of equity against which landowners may borrow.130 Landowners who hold 
the majority of their wealth in their land may “view their land as both a retirement fund and an 
124 Id.
125
 Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 348.  
126 Id.
127 See Farmland Information, supra note 119.
128
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 349.  
129 See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 10 at 435-39 (discussing economic impact of agricultural zoning on those whose 
land is zoned for agricultural use).
130 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 348-49; Farmland Information, supra note 119.
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insurance policy.”131 In addition, because much of the country’s productive agricultural land is 
located on the urban fringe, landowners in such areas may not see agricultural zoning as a 
guarantee against suburban sprawl and eventual conversion.132  Thus, many agricultural 
landowners resent agricultural zoning because it infringes on their ability to sell their land at its 
highest value, and believe that “if most of the benefits from preservation go to society as a 
whole, then the cost of preservation should be placed on society as well.”133  Because 
landowners often dispute the fairness and validity of agricultural zoning, agricultural zoning 
schemes lead to “frequent legal challenges.”134
In addition, when agricultural zoning schemes are not properly implemented, they may 
actually lead to heightened developmental pressures and increased suburban sprawl.  For 
example, if a locality with a large amount of land zoned for agricultural use consistently grants 
variances that allow intensive development, the effectiveness of the agricultural zoning scheme 
is sacrificed.  Also, many localities employ agricultural zones that permit residential 
development on smaller parcels of land.135  Such agricultural zoning schemes are easily 
manipulated to create large blocks of agricultural “estates,” which are nothing more than 
residential land on which agricultural production is done only to the extent to meet the minimum 
required by the zoning scheme.136  Thus, developers can easily accomplish an end-run around an 
agricultural zoning scheme that is not implemented in a comprehensive, well-planned manner to 
131 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 109.
132 Id.
133
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 435.
134 Id. at 422.
135 See, e.g., Farmland Information, supra note 119 (“Many towns and counties have agricultural/residential zoning 
that allows construction of houses on lots of one to five acres.”).
136 See, e.g., HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 129 (discussing the agricultural zoning scheme in Oregon’s 
Willamette Valley, which has allowed hundreds of “hobby farms” to replace large blocks of productive agricultural 
land).  See also Farmland Information, supra note 119 (noting how the agricultural zoning schemes in Wyoming and 
Colorado have allowed “the creation of hundreds of 35-acre ‘ranchettes’”); Paul Snyder, How Does a Small, 
Agricultural County Manage Growth? at http://www.law.du.edu/rmlui/HotTopics (discussing adoption of thirty-five 
acre lot size in Colorado).
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address this possibility.  Such ineffective agricultural zoning schemes “often hasten the decline 
of agriculture by allowing residences to consume far more land than necessary,”137 leading to 
leapfrog development and enhanced suburban sprawl.  
Where non-voluntary agricultural zoning schemes place the costs of preservation on 
individual landowners, other land use planning tools place the burden directly on taxpayers.  For 
example, PDR programs use tax proceeds to purchase development rights directly from 
agricultural landowners.138  Closely related to PDR programs are transfer of development rights 
(“TDR”) programs, which transfer developable land to landowners in exchange for the 
development rights on landowners’ agricultural land.139  Conservation easements work in a very 
similar manner—the owner of the agricultural land grants an easement to allow agricultural 
production to continue.  Conservation easements can either be bought with tax funds, as with 
PDR or TDR programs, or donated by agricultural landowners.  These programs avoid the 
pressures which agricultural zoning schemes are subject to because the permitted use of the land 
cannot be changed by a simple rezoning.  Rather, the development rights to the land must be 
bought from their holder, usually the state or federal government.140  However, because these 
programs are voluntary, they do not produce the same results that agricultural zoning schemes 
do.  Donated conservation easements, for example, are only implemented at the whim of private 
landowners.  PDR, TDR, and purchased conservation easement programs are very expensive, 
and as a result have little impact on preserving productive agricultural land when they are not 
implemented as part of a larger land use planning scheme.  Because most productive agricultural 
land is located on the urban fringe, it is likely to have a high fair market value.  As a result, when 
137
 Farmland Information, supra note 119.
138 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 345.  
139 Id. at 346.
140 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (discussing federal legislation permitting federal funds, either 
alone or in combination with state funds, to be used to purchase development rights to agricultural land).
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voluntary programs are implemented to purchase development rights on such land, the funds are 
not likely to stretch very far.
In considering the effectiveness of voluntary programs, the role of non-governmental 
actors should not be overlooked.  There are a variety of non-governmental entities, such as land 
trusts, that operate outside of the formal governmental structure, using private funds to purchase 
the development rights to agricultural land or even to purchase agricultural land outright.141
These private organizations typically work at a local level, although national organizations, such 
as the Nature Conservancy, are organized for the same purpose.  Such organizations frequently 
step into the breach when land use planning measures are not adequately protecting and 
preserving agricultural land.142  Unfortunately, their efforts are organized only according to their 
internal plans, and not as part of a comprehensive governmental effort.  As a result, these 
organizations function in an ad hoc manner, much like the federal government.  If land use 
planning had any sort of direction on a national level, the efforts of these organizations would be 
far more effective, for they could organize their work in a manner that complemented the 
national plan.  
In summary, a wide variety of land use planning tools are available to help states protect 
and preserve their valuable agricultural land.  However, these tools are rarely successful when 
employed in isolation.  Rather, each tool has its respective strengths and weaknesses.  Therefore, 
the most effective way to balance the competing interests between development and preservation 
is to deploy these tools in a manner that allows them to complement one another and play on 
their respective advantages.  The increasing rates of agricultural land conversion can be 
explained, at least in part, by states’ general failure to implement a comprehensive land use 
141 See Wildermuth, supra note 44, at 79-80.  
142 Id.
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planning model that accomplishes this.  However, several states have attempted to do exactly 
that, though not with perfect success.  The following Section examines Oregon’s comprehensive 
land use planning model, which incorporates a variety of the land use planning tools discussed 
above.  
2.  Oregon: An (Almost) Effective Statewide Land Use Planning Model
Oregon’s statewide land use planning program, designed to protect and preserve 
agricultural land, has been credited as the most comprehensive model in the nation.143  As a 
result, several states have recently enacted similar programs.144  However, studies have shown
that productive agricultural land continues to be developed and converted to other uses in Oregon 
at increasing rates despite the existence of its comprehensive model.  Therefore, while the 
Oregon plan serves as an example of the manner in which various land use planning tools can be 
used to complement one another, it is also a lesson in the intricacies and pratfalls inherent in 
balancing the need for development with the goal of agricultural preservation.  
Oregon implemented its state-wide land use planning program, featuring a farmland 
protection program, in 1973.145  Oregon’s program sets out certain statewide land use planning 
goals, including the protection of agricultural land, and empowers the state government to 
periodically review each county’s comprehensive land use planning program to ensure that it 
complies with the goals.146  Each county in Oregon is required to identify its prime agricultural 
lands, designate them in its comprehensive plan, and zone them for exclusive farm use 
143 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 352.
144 Id.
145 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 128.
146 See id.
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(“EFU”).147 Thus, EFU zones allow only agricultural production and accessory uses.  In EFU 
zones, agricultural land benefits from property tax deferrals and is protected from nuisance suits 
by right-to-farm laws.148 In addition to the mandatory EFU zones, many counties in Oregon
have created UGBs and buffer zones designed to direct residential and commercial development 
inward and prevent suburban sprawl from claiming intermediate agricultural land.149
The Oregon Legislature has also created a Land Use Board of Appeals (“LUBA”), a three 
judge panel that decides all land use cases. 150  While LUBA decisions are binding, parties have 
the ability to appeal to the state courts.151  Oregon courts have held that citizens are entitled to a 
private right of action with regard to land use issues,152 and have construed standing broadly, 
allowing anyone who participates in a local proceeding to appeal an adverse decision.153  Finally, 
the Oregon Supreme Court has held that zoning decisions are not entitled to presumptive 
validity, which effectively shifts the burden of proof in cases challenging zoning decisions to 
local governments, requiring them to justify land use decisions in light of the comprehensive
land use planning program.154
While Oregon has shown great foresight by enacting a statewide land use planning 
program designed to address agricultural land conversion, the program has its deficiencies.  As 
discussed above, prime agricultural land continues to be converted at increasing rates in Oregon.  
This may indicate that the state is not managing its growth in a way that strikes a proper balance 
between development and agricultural land protection.  It has been suggested that the increased 
147 See id. See also Cordes, supra note 10, at 352 (discussing Oregon’s land use program).
148 See HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 128.
149 Id.
150 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.540 (1997).
151 Id.
152 See Cordes, supra note 10, at 353.
153 See Jefferson Landfill Comm. V. Marion County, 686 P.2d 310, 313 (Or. 1984) (en banc).
154 See Fasano v. Board of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by 
Neuburger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1979).
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rates of conversion are a result of the fact that the state program was implemented fairly 
slowly.155  However, Oregon has had over thirty years to fine-tune its program, yet the rates 
continue to escalate.  At this point, systemic problems, such as those detailed below, are more 
likely at fault.  
The statewide adoption of land use planning goals, while laudable, is insufficient to 
establish the infrastructure necessary to control development.  Under the current program, each 
county must comply with statewide goals, but the comprehensive land use plan is different in 
each county.  Oregon’s program would be far more efficient if this structure was reversed, and a 
flexible comprehensive plan adopted at the statewide level.  By doing so, Oregon could provide 
its individual counties with an established framework to help implement statewide goals.  The 
implementation of the various land use planning tools contained in the state plan could then be 
tailored to suit the individual nature of each county, ensuring that each piece was being used with 
the end goal in mind: an appropriate balance between development and protection.  
Oregon’s plan has also not proven itself capable of responding to ordinary market 
pressures.  The UGBs and buffer zones employed by many of the counties in Oregon have 
actually been shown to increase suburban sprawl and the conversion of productive agricultural 
land because of the widespread prevalence of “hobby farms.”156  For example, over 350,000 
acres of land are zoned for rural residential—with three to five acre minimum lot sizes—in the 
Willamette Valley, perhaps Oregon’s most productive agricultural region.157  As discussed 
above, zoning schemes that allow such development frequently promote suburban sprawl as the 
land becomes more developed.  In addition, Oregon’s UGB’s and buffer zones have shown a 
155 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 129.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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great tendency to increase housing prices within their boundaries.158 As this occurs, suburban 
sprawl and leapfrog development are encouraged because the market exerts pressure to expand 
outward to EFU zones.159  Thus, the allowance of “hobby farms” seriously endangers productive 
agricultural land.160
Oregon has certainly set the standard by being the first state to adopt a statewide program 
designed to protect agricultural land.  Yet, the mixed success of the program and the deficiencies 
identified above demonstrate that additional measures are needed.  In general, “more direction, 
monitoring, and enforcement is needed . . . to help counties comply with urban growth 
boundaries, channel rural development . . . and apply agricultural zoning to pursue the goal of 
protecting farmland in large blocks.”161 While Oregon’s land use program should inform the 
development of a comprehensive land use planning scheme designed to protect agricultural land, 
Oregon’s program should be viewed as a building block rather than a standard.  
IV.  LAND USE REGULATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL “TAKINGS” CHALLENGES
In developing a comprehensive land use planning model, care must be taken to ensure 
that the model meets established legal standards. When governments implement land use 
planning schemes, “they are influencing land values and the potential wealth of landowners.”162
Because land use planning tools—particularly non-voluntary land use planning tools such as 
agricultural zoning schemes—have such an influence on the private sector, they frequently 
158 See Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 442.
159 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 129.  This pressure is necessarily focused outward rather than inward 
to urban areas because urban areas are already developed.  
160 See id. 
161 Id. at 130.
162 Id. at 107.
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provoke legal challenges.  Therefore, the legal implications of land use planning schemes must 
be taken into account, and programs must be drafted with these legal implications in mind.  The 
following discussion addresses the most important legal consideration, the Fifth Amendment 
“takings” challenge, with particular emphasis placed on this legal doctrine’s application to non-
voluntary agricultural zoning schemes.  
Zoning in general has long been recognized as an acceptable use of governmental “police 
power” under the Tenth Amendment.163  The United States Supreme Court first addressed the 
validity of zoning schemes in the landmark case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty 
Co.164 In Euclid, the court held that zoning schemes are an acceptable use of police power so 
long as they are “asserted for the public welfare”165—in other words, “to achieve a clearly 
defined public purpose.”166  Applied to agricultural zoning, this constitutional test is met if the 
legislation enabling the zoning scheme declares the protection of agricultural lands to be an 
important public goal and the agricultural zoning scheme is implemented in a manner consistent 
with the enabling legislation.167 In addition, it is advisable for states to take the additional step of 
employing agricultural zoning pursuant to a “carefully drafted comprehensive plan,”168 rather 
than on an ad hoc basis.169  While these initial legal constraints must be considered by states 
adopting agricultural zoning schemes, the “primary and most significant”170 legal challenges to 
163 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
164
 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
165 Id. at 387.
166 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 107.
167 See id.; Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 349; Cordes, supra note 10, at 425.
168 HOLDING OUR GROUND, supra note 14, at 107.  See also Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 349 (“[M]ost states require 
that zoning be applied in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”).
169
 States should take particular care to adopt comprehensive land use plans because “land use regulations which are 
administered arbitrarily and capriciously often instigate due process attacks.”  Szlanfucht, supra note 3, at 349.  For 
an example of the application of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, see Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 
16, 70 P.3d 47 (“[M]unicipal land use decision should be upheld unless those decisions are arbitrary and capricious 
or otherwise illegal.”).  
170
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 425.
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zoning schemes come in the form of Fifth Amendment171 “takings” challenges.172  This form of 
legal challenge is common “because of the significant economic impact that agricultural zoning 
can have on land values as compared to alternative uses.”173 Because a depressed property value 
is almost invariably the result of an agricultural zoning scheme, states should take precautions 
when drafting comprehensive land use planning models to ensure that their agricultural zoning 
schemes comply with the applicable legal standards, particularly those set forth in the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.174
Current takings doctrine is derived from two major Supreme Court cases: Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council175 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.176 The 
“regulatory taking” doctrine, first defined in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,177 “recognizes 
that in very limited situations the economic impact of a land use regulation might be so severe as
to constitute an unconstitutional taking of property.”178 When this occurs, the government may 
not apply the land use regulation to the land at issue without compensating the landowner for the 
taking.  
A land use regulation may be found to be an unconstitutional taking of property under
either of two separate tests.  First, a land use regulation may be an unconstitutional taking of 
property under Lucas if it deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of the property—
171 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”  Id.
172
 Takings challenges may also be based on state constitutions, though most challenges are based on the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.  See, e.g., Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 
1991) (“Although [takings] standards bear the imprint of federal constitutional doctrine, our own state constitutional 
principles governing the taking of property are in general conformity.”).
173
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 425-26.
174
 533 U.S. 393 (2001).
175
 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
176
 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
177
 260 U.S. 393 (1992).
178
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 426.
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in other words, if it is a complete taking.179  Second, a land use regulation may amount to a 
taking even where it does not deprive the landowner of all economically viable use of his 
property if the Penn Central test is met.180 Under the Penn Central test, a court conducts a 
multi-factored inquiry into the application of a land use regulation to a parcel of property, 
focusing on “the character of the government action, its economic impact, and the degree of 
interference with investment-backed expectations.”181 Thus, the analysis applied to a takings 
claim when a land use restriction is challenged is a two-step process: (1) whether the regulation 
deprives the land of all economically viable use; and (2) if not, whether the regulation still 
qualifies as a taking under the Penn Central factors.  Though the Supreme Court has never 
applied this analysis to an agricultural zoning scheme, “a significant number of lower courts 
have . . . with the vast majority of cases holding that the restriction was not a taking.”182 Lower 
courts have consistently held that agricultural zoning is not a taking under the Lucas test where 
“the land is suitable for agricultural use and is economically viable.”183  Lower courts have also 
regularly held that agricultural zoning meets the Penn Central test.184  Most courts that have 
179 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.  The Court provided an exception to this rule: if the regulation is preventing what would 
amount to a common law nuisance under state law, then even loss of all economically viable use is not a taking.  Id. 
at 1029-31.  Thus, if an agricultural zoning scheme were challenged as a taking, loss of all economically viable use 
of the land would not amount to a taking if the landowner’s use of the property constituted a nuisance under state 
law.
180 Id at 1019 n.8.
181
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 427.
182 Id.  See also Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 1991) (applying federal takings 
doctrine to agricultural zoning scheme); Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 
1993) (same).
183
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 427.  See also Bell River Associates v. Charter Township of China, 565 N.W. 2d 695, 
700 (“[A] plaintiff who alleges that he was denied economically viable use of his land must show that the property is 
either unsuitable for use as zoned or unmarketable as zoned.”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
184 See, e.g., Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 N.E. 2d 1300, 1303 (Mass. 1996) (plaintiff could not have 
reasonable investment backed expectations in developing subdivision in flood plain where land was already zoned to 
restrict such uses when plaintiff purchased it); Gardner, 593 A.2d at 261 (holding plaintiff’s takings claim failed 
Penn Central test because restriction did not interfere with plaintiff’s investment backed expectations) .
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struck down agricultural zoning schemes have done so because the land the scheme was being 
applied to was unsuitable for farming.185
While Lucas and Penn Central provide the framework for takings challenges, the Court’s 
opinion in Palazzolo “has the potential of significantly impacting regulatory takings analysis,” 
including agricultural zoning, because “the Court’s analysis is applicable to a broad array of land 
use restrictions.”186 Palazzolo involved a “wetlands restriction which had been in place when the 
claimant acquired the property and had the effect of prohibiting all development except the 
possible building of a house on several uplands acres.”187  Prior to Palazzolo, lower federal 
courts had consistently held that landowners with notice of a land use restriction at the time the 
property was purchased were precluded from maintaining a takings claim.188 However, the 
Court expanded its takings jurisprudence in Palazzolo by holding that prior notice of a restriction 
does not preclude a takings claim.189  The Court concluded that the plaintiff had not been 
deprived of all economically viable use of the property under the Lucas test, but remanded the 
case for a determination of whether the Penn Central test had been met.190  Thus, under 
Palazzolo a landowner may establish that a taking has occurred under Penn Central even if the 
land use restriction at issue was in effect at the time the property was purchased and the 
landowner is not deprived of all economically viable use of his property.
185 See, e.g., Pettee v. County of Dekalb, 376 N.E. 2d 720, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding agricultural zoning 
restrictions resulted in taking because zoned property was unsuitable for farming); Semja v. County of Boone, 339 
N.E. 2d 452, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (same).  An overarching theme in takings jurisprudence, however, is that land 
use regulations do not amount to a taking simply because they “involve[ ] a substantial economic burden on the 
landowner.”  Cordes, supra note 10, at 429.  See also Gardner, 593 A.2d 251, 260 (“[I]mpairment of the 
marketability of land alone does not effect a taking . . . . [and] restrictions on uses do not necessarily result in takings 
although they reduce income or profits.”)  (citations omitted).
186
 Cordes, supra note 10, at 429.
187 Id. 
188 See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that such notice negated 
investment based expectations); Leonard, 666 N.E. 2d at 1303 (holding that where plaintiff had purchased property 
subject to flood-plains restrictions, she could not complain of right she never had). 
189 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625-29.
190 Id. at 629-30.
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Although Palazzolo altered the regulatory takings landscape, states that are administering 
their land use planning schemes appropriately will likely not be affected by the change.  Initially, 
Palazzolo affirmed the principle that even minimal economic viability is enough to avoid a 
categorical taking under Lucas.191  Thus, agriculturally zoned land meets the Lucas test as long 
as the land to which the zoning scheme applies is actually suitable for agricultural use, as lower 
federal courts have long held.192  Because this is a very low burden, any zoning scheme that is 
actually designed to protect agricultural land should meet the Lucas test.  
The real open question in the aftermath of Palazzolo involves the application of the Penn 
Central factors to land use regulations.  While prior notice of a land use restriction no longer 
precludes a takings claim, Justice O’Connor indicated in a concurring opinion (which four other 
justices joined) that notice is a relevant factor for courts to consider in addressing the third Penn 
Central factor: the degree to which a land use restriction interferes with a landowner’s 
reasonable investment backed expectations193 (which Penn Central labeled as the most important 
factor in the analysis).194  Therefore, a landowner who purchases a parcel of property zoned for 
agricultural use is still unlikely to mount a successful takings challenge under Penn Central
because his investment backed expectations will necessarily be set by the zoning in place at the 
time of purchase.  However, an agricultural zoning scheme that is applied to land that was 
previously zoned for other uses may be in danger.  For example, if a state decided to apply an 
agricultural zoning scheme to a large block of land that had been zoned for commercial use, the 
landowners’ investment backed expectations would likely be diminished by the agricultural 
191 Id. at 629.
192 See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing lower federal courts’ application of the Lucas test to 
agricultural zoning schemes).
193 Id. at 631-32; id. at 638-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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zoning scheme.  Even in such a situation, however, the concept of “regulatory risk” recognized 
in Lucas195 suggests that another of the Penn Central factors, such as the character of the 
governmental action, may be necessary for a court to hold that the Penn Central test had been 
met.  To be safe, though, state and local governments should identify currently productive 
agricultural land to which to apply agricultural zoning rather than attempting to convert land 
zoned for other uses to agricultural production.  In general, if an agricultural zoning scheme is 
implemented as part of a comprehensive land use plan, is rationally based on accurate 
information regarding the composition of a locality’s lands, and is applied systematically rather 
than in isolated instances, it is unlikely that a takings challenge to an agricultural zoning scheme 
will be successful under Palazzolo.  While takings claims will continue to be a legitimate 
concern for state and local governments, properly conceived and implemented comprehensive 
land use planning schemes will be upheld under current takings jurisprudence.  
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLANNING MODEL
Land use planning is a complex and multi-faceted task.  The widespread development 
and conversion of productive agricultural land is the result of many variables, which may be 
more or less influential in any given state or locality.  Because of this, land use planning to 
balance development and agricultural land preservation will not be the same in every situation.  
If the exact same scheme were implemented everywhere, the results would vary wildly; while 
conversion rates would decrease in some localities, they would likely increase in others.  
Therefore, a properly conceived land use planning model must be flexible enough to account for 
195 Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (“[T]he property owner [must] necessarily expect[ ] the uses of his property to be 
restricted, from time to time.”).
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differences among states and localities, yet capable of producing predictable and similar results.  
This can only be accomplished by incorporating various land use planning tools and allowing 
them to be adjusted to suit the individual character and composition of each state.  In this 
manner, land use planning tools can be deployed in a complementary fashion, with one land use 
planning tool’s strengths making up for another’s weaknesses.  The final goal of this Article is to 
suggest a comprehensive land use planning model that incorporates a variety of land use 
planning tools in this manner, thus creating a model that is capable of addressing agricultural 
land conversion in any state or locality.   
To begin with, a comprehensive land use planning model needs to be just that: 
comprehensive.  As discussed above, states must be aware of the legal implications of land use 
regulations, and ensure that land use planning is done in a manner that meets established legal 
standards.196 To accomplish this, states need to draft enabling legislation indicating that the 
establishment and maintenance of a proper balance between development and agricultural land 
protection is an important state goal.197  In addition, states need to take care to ensure that the 
land use planning scheme is consistently implemented in a manner that comports with this 
goal.198  Arbitrary variations from the overarching goal risk being challenged as inconsistent with 
the state’s goal.199  Moreover, ad hoc applications of land use planning regulations to individual 
parcels of property are at particular risk for legal challenge.200  In short, states need to ensure that 
land use regulations are imposed as part of a well-planned, strategic package—a comprehensive 
196 See supra notes 162-95 and accompanying text (discussing legal restraints on land use planning measures).
197 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (discussing need for state enabling legislation).
198 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (discussing proper implementation of land use planning 
regulations).
199 Id.
200 See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (discussing increased risk of takings challenges when land use 
regulations are not employed as part of a comprehensive plan). 
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package in which each land use planning tool is utilized in a manner consistent with the state’s 
goal.  
A necessary prerequisite to the establishment of  a comprehensive land use planning is an 
intensive information-gathering process to determine the character and composition of states’
land.  A comprehensive land use planning model cannot be applied comprehensively if states 
have insufficient information about their own makeup.201  To this end, detailed surveys and 
statistical analyses are needed.  This can be accomplished in a variety of ways.  Initially, the 
federal government should assist in the effort by updating the LESA information gathering 
system and making it available to every state.  The federal LESA system needs to be reworked so 
that the value of agricultural land is not discounted to account for increased developmental 
pressure.  Because the majority of the productive agricultural land in America is located on the 
urban fringe, developmental pressures are likely to be higher.  By discounting for these 
pressures, the federal LESA system ensures that that the value of much prime agricultural land is 
artificially deflated, and thus deemed less worthy of protection.202  Instead, the federal LESA 
system should simply rate agricultural land based on its productive value, and make this 
information available to states.  In this manner, states can better identify their most productive 
agricultural land, regardless of location, and deploy their comprehensive land use planning 
packages in a manner likely to protect it.
Second, states must have access to comprehensive state-specific land use information.  
For example, states would benefit from information regarding existing land use, growth trends, 
201
 Information gathering is not only a common-sense initial step to the adoption of a comprehensive land use 
planning model, but is necessary to meet established legal standards.  If a land use planning regulation is imposed 
improperly on land that is not suited for the restriction, the regulation runs a high risk of being struck down upon 
legal challenge.  See supra notes 168-69, 179-92 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of imposing a land 
use regulation only on land that is well-suited for the regulation).
202 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing federal LESA system). 
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developmental pressures, and desired changes in land use.  This is another area where the federal 
government can assist in the effort.  To date, the federal government has enacted very limited 
legislation to assist in the protection of agricultural land, providing funding for the 
implementation of a very narrow class of voluntary land use planning tools.203  The federal 
government could provide a much greater benefit to states by using federal funds to assist states 
in establishing comprehensive land use planning models.  The federal government could help
accomplish this by providing funds, either alone or in combination with state funds, to be used 
for statewide information gathering processes.  In other words, information gathering should be 
organized from a top-down, national level, and should be accomplished in a manner that states 
are provided with truly accurate and helpful land use information.  The conversion of agricultural 
land on a state level is a problem facing the nation as a whole, and Congress needs to address the 
problem by enacting legislation that provides states with substantive support rather than simply 
leaving land use planning to state and local governments.  In the absence of federal assistance, 
states need to provide funding on their own to gather all-inclusive information regarding the 
composition and uses of their land.  
In addition to funding the information gathering process, the federal government should
take additional steps to ensure that its programs complement comprehensive land use planning 
on a state level.  The best way to accomplish this is for the federal government itself to fund the 
development of a comprehensive land use planning model that can be implemented in every state 
in America.  The federal government should develop such a model, identifying key areas of 
federal involvement and which programs should be left to state and local governments.  In this 
manner, the federal government can ensure that its programs properly complement state land use 
203 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing federal legislation to provide states with federal funds 
for PDR programs and conservation easements).
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planning regulations.  In addition, the development of such a model would align the federal 
government and state governments with the same goal.  For example, the federal government has 
enacted a variety of programs that fund, at least partially, states’ PDR and conservation easement 
programs.204  Were the federal government to develop a model for comprehensive land use 
planning, it could enact legislation that furthers the model, rather than leaving states to use 
federal programs arbitrarily.  Moreover, the federal government could then provide states with an 
incentive to adopt its model by tying its funding efforts to the model, as it has done with highway 
programs.  States adopting the comprehensive land use planning model would then receive 
federal funding to assist with the implementation of various land use planning tools.  At the very 
least, the federal government needs to give states an incentive to adopt comprehensive land use 
planning models that curb unplanned development. At a minimum, the federal government 
should adopt uniform standards for land use planning that states must meet in order to receive 
federal funding.  Thus, federal funding—for example, for PDR programs—would only be 
provided to states with land use planning models meeting the minimum standards established by 
the federal government.205
These proposals necessarily suggest a large role for the federal government in land use 
planning.  Major national land use planning initiatives have been proposed twice before, and 
both times have proven unsuccessful.  First, the USDA was reorganized during the New Deal in 
a manner that allowed land use information to be fed to the USDA from the bottom up—in other 
words, from the county level.206  Planning communities were organized in each community to 
gather information on the composition of each locality by developing maps of existing land 
204 See id.
205
 The federal government came closest to doing this with FAIR, which provided federal funding to states with 
dedicated farmland preservation programs.  See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing FAIR 
program).
206 See Wildermuth, supra note 44, at 75.  
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use.207  “Once existing land use was mapped, the local committees discussed desired changes in 
land use and translated those changes onto a second county map.”208  This information was then 
transmitted to the USDA, which was to organize its actions in accordance with the land use plans 
of the localities.209  While this program seemed well-suited to harmonize local and national 
interests, it proved too complex to manage due to the difficulty inherent in “creat[ing] a coherent 
national policy simply by adding up the wishes of individual counties.”210
Second, national land use planning reemerged during the 1960s and 1970s as “a response 
to rapid urban growth and the disappearance of open space”—the same motivating factors that 
are once again relevant at the beginning of the twenty-first century.211  Senator Henry Jackson 
proposed the National Land Use Policy Bill, which contained “a simple program of data 
collection and agency organization” at the federal level.212  Under the program, “[t]he federal 
government would give states money to gather data, classify land, and write a plan for 
coordinating state land use decisions.  Once each state had its affairs in order, federal agencies 
could simply reference the states’ plans and determine how federal investments should be 
allocated.”213  The plan ultimately failed in large part due to simple politics.  President Nixon 
proposed a competing bill, eventually combined with Jackson’s bill, which contained an 
incentive scheme whereby states would only receive federal funds if they exercised certain land 
use powers at the state rather than the local level.214  The joint bill appeared before Congress 
several times, but was never passed.215
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While the model suggested in this Article does propose a large role for the federal 
government, it does not necessarily amount to national land use planning.216  Rather, the 
proposed model calls for nationally organized land use planning, with the federal government 
providing a blueprint rather than a set of orders.  The information gathering process proposed 
here avoids the failures of the New Deal national land use planning proposals because it is 
organized as a pyramid rather than a siphon.  Instead of attempting to create a national land use 
policy by referencing the sum total of community policies, the plan proposed here calls for a 
nationally organized information gathering process to provide localities with information 
necessary to implement responsible land use planning decisions.  It also avoids the failures of the 
national land use planning initiatives of the 1970s because it does more than simply reference 
states’ land use plans in order to determine proper federal expenditures.  Instead, the model 
proposed here calls for a coherent national land use planning policy that installs as a goal the 
preservation of valuable, productive agricultural land while allowing development to proceed in 
an intelligent, organized fashion.  In furtherance of this goal, a land use planning model capable 
of accomplishing this goal can be developed by the federal government and provided for states to 
implement.  States could then implement the land use planning model in manner best suited to 
their particular needs, identified in the first step of nationally organized information gathering.  
In addition, by organizing land use planning on a national level, the federal government would 
be better equipped to implement federal programs in a manner complementary to state land use 
216
 Nor is this Article the only modern proposal for federal land use planning.  For example, Bruce Babbitt, former 
interior secretary in the Clinton administration, recently published a volume advocating for national land use 
planning.  BRUCE BABBITT, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS: A NEW VISION OF LAND USE IN AMERICA (Island Press 
2006).  According to Mr. Babbitt, “[t]he notion that land use is a local matter has come to dominate the political 
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TAX DOLLARS (Hill & Wang 2006).  
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planning schemes.  It could also ensure that a wide variety of federal legislation, such as highway 
funding and home mortgage programs, is implemented consistently with land use policy.
While the federal government certainly has a large and important role to play in land use 
planning, it is true that most land use planning tools are properly implemented on a state and 
local level.  Thus, the remainder of this Section discusses the manner in which a variety of land 
use planning tools can be effectively deployed in a complementary manner by state and local 
governments as part of a comprehensive land use planning package.  The discussion that follows 
should be viewed as a suggestion for a comprehensive land use planning model.  However, 
essential to the plan proposed by this Article is the funding and development of such a model by 
the federal government.  Such a model should be extremely comprehensive, containing 
suggestions for the deployment of land use planning tools in a great variety of situations along 
with considerations to be taken into account in each instance.  In essence, what this Article 
proposes is a federally funded manual to effective land use planning.  Such a model obviously 
cannot be detailed to the extent necessary within the constraints of this Article.  Therefore, the 
model proposed here is but one example of the manner in which various land use planning tools 
can utilized as part of a comprehensive model.  
To begin with, a carefully planned statewide zoning strategy should be the backbone of 
any land use planning program.  The point of the initial information gathering step is to clearly 
identify the location of various categories of land.  Once this is accomplished, states can apply a 
zoning scheme to classify these categories and define the uses which are allowed in each 
category.  Because agricultural zoning is such an effective method of preserving productive 
agricultural land,217 it should be deployed to the furthest extent allowable under the law. States 
217 See supra notes 98-128 and accompanying text (discussing types of agricultural zoning and their corresponding 
benefits).
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should apply exclusive agricultural zoning schemes to all large blocks of readily identifiable 
agricultural land.  Exclusive agricultural zoning schemes are the least expensive way for states to 
preserve large areas of productive agricultural land, and are very effective at preventing suburban 
sprawl from gradually diminishing the productivity of the area.218  In addition, states can 
generally avoid legal challenges by limiting the application of exclusive agricultural zoning 
schemes to large blocks of land that are currently well-suited to agricultural production and 
where market pressures have not yet begun to mount.219 This type of agricultural zoning has 
proven effective in Oregon, and other states should follow its lead.220
In addition to exclusive agricultural zoning, states should apply non-exclusive 
agricultural zoning schemes to smaller blocks of productive agricultural land which are currently 
well-suited for agricultural use.221  Because of the flexibility that non-exclusive agricultural 
zoning schemes offer, they are more likely to be effective at balancing competing interests in 
smaller areas of agricultural land, which are more likely to be subject to market pressures.222
Within these areas, state and local governments should implement their non-exclusive 
agricultural zoning schemes in a variety of ways, depending on the particular needs of the 
locality.223  Where possible, large minimum lot sizes should be imposed to prevent the 
manipulation of the agricultural zoning scheme to create agricultural estates and hobby farms.
The largest minimum lot size possible for land in the area should be imposed.  For example, if 
218 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (discussing exclusive agricultural zoning schemes).
219 Id.
220 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon’s use of EFU zones).
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 This is not to suggest that all land which is capable of agricultural production should be designated for 
agricultural use.  In surveying the composition of their land, states will no doubt identify agriculturally productive 
land that is, for example, broken up into small parcels, located in between an urban or suburban area and larger 
blocks of agricultural land, and currently subject to intense market pressure to develop.  It would not be at all 
inappropriate for states to set such areas of land aside as future growth zones or buffer zones.  
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the smallest parcel of land in a certain block of agricultural land is twenty acres, the minimum lot 
size should be set at twenty acres.
Where agricultural land has already been divided into smaller parcels, sliding-scale zones
should be used, with the highest barrier to development possible being imposed.  For example, if 
agricultural land in a given area is broken down into parcels averaging between ten and eighty 
acres, the locality should begin the sliding-scale zone at ten acres to prevent the parcels from 
being divided into smaller pieces.  In addition, state and local governments should employ buffer 
zones and UGBs to set agricultural land apart from urban and suburban development, but 
carefully monitor their progress to ensure that problems such as those occurring in Oregon do not 
surface.224  Cluster zoning should imposed only when it is iron-clad because it allows small 
portions of agricultural land to be developed intensively, frequently creating subdivisions in the 
corner of larger agricultural units that then exert developmental pressure on the rest of the 
land.225 However, cluster zoning is effective at preserving a large piece of productive 
agricultural land, and should be utilized if the continued viability of the agricultural portion of 
the parcel can be guaranteed.  If cluster zoning cannot be utilized in this manner, state and local 
governments can implement fixed area allocations, imposing the largest possible minimum lot 
size.  In addition, state and local governments should establish UGBs between all land zoned for 
agricultural use and land zoned for other uses wherever possible to force growth inward rather 
than outward.  When this is not feasible due to already established development, traditional 
buffer zones should be employed, again with the largest minimum lot size possible.  
State governments should also adopt programs to benefit agricultural land located within 
their agricultural zones.  Tax incentive programs are a necessity to prevent the value of 
224 See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (discussing buffer zones and UGBs); notes 156-60 (discussing the 
problems associated with UGBs and buffer zones in Oregon). 
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agricultural land being driven up as development begins to encroach on the agricultural boundary 
and exert market pressures.226 In addition, state governments should draft their tax incentive 
legislation very strictly to prevent developers from taking advantage of favorable tax schemes 
while preparing land for subdivision and development.227  This is particularly important in buffer 
zones and non-exclusive agricultural zones employing sliding-scale or cluster zoning methods, 
where more development opportunities exist.  In addition, state governments should ensure that 
right to farm laws are in place to protect agricultural landowners from litigation.228 Again, these 
laws are particularly necessary in buffer zones and non-exclusive agricultural zones employing 
sliding-scale or cluster zoning methods, where productive agricultural land is located in closer 
proximity to residential or other development.
Although agricultural zoning is a necessary component of any comprehensive land use 
planning model, it is not capable of adequately defusing market pressures to develop by itself.229
As applied to agricultural land that directly abuts urban or suburban development, agricultural 
zoning may not be an effective land use planning tool.  This is because there may be extensive 
development interspersed with agricultural land in such areas, making application of an 
agricultural zoning scheme less feasible.  Because much of the productive agricultural land in 
America is located near urban areas, this is a particularly important area of focus for state and 
local governments enacting comprehensive land use planning schemes.  While agricultural 
zoning should be deployed to the extent possible, other voluntary land use planning tools may be 
more effective in preserving agricultural land in such situations. 230  States should encourage 
226 See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing tax incentive programs).
227 Id.
228 See supra notes 96-99 (discussing right to farm laws).
229 See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of agricultural zoning schemes).
230 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary PDR, TDR, and conservation easement 
programs).
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owners of agricultural land to donate conservation easements on land located in such areas.  
Conservation easements are effective in preserving agricultural production, and do not entail a 
heavy financial burden on state and local governments.231  States can further encourage the 
donation of conservation easements through incentive programs, such as favorable tax schemes 
and deductions.  In addition, states should employ PDR and TDR programs to secure 
development rights on productive agricultural land.  While these programs are the most 
expensive land use planning tools, they are extremely effective in preserving productive 
agricultural land.232  States should take advantage of federal funding for these programs to the 
furthest extent possible, and carefully apply the funds to land which other land use planning tools 
are unlikely to preserve.  The federal government can assist in states’ efforts by increasing 
funding for these programs and monitoring states’ use of the funds to ensure that federal 
programs are having the maximum impact.  States should also use state funds to implement these 
programs, strategically employing these programs to purchase development rights to more 
endangered agricultural land.  Finally, governments at both the federal and state level should 
coordinate their land use planning efforts with those of private organizations such as land trusts.  
Such organizations frequently use private funds to purchase development rights to agricultural 
land, and to date have done so outside of any organized governmental framework.233  By co-
opting the efforts of such organizations, governments can maximize the impact of private funds 
and ensure that private efforts complement the comprehensive land use plan.    
In summary, land use planning tools cannot be deployed in isolation, for they are only 
truly effective when implemented in a complementary fashion as part of a comprehensive land 
use planning package.  Each level of government has its role in promoting intelligent land use 
231 Id.
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233 See Wildermuth, supra note 44, at 80.
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planning.  The federal government can provide individual states with structure and funding to 
implement their land use planning schemes.  States governments are necessarily the repository of 
comprehensive land use planning, but must be given incentives to contribute to a broad national 
goal.  While state governments should be encouraged to adopt comprehensive land use planning 
strategies, land use planning tools must be implemented on a local level, with state governments 
providing the necessary oversight.  Each piece of the puzzle must be complementary: the federal 
government must ensure that its legislation complements state and local programs, and state 
governments must ensure that each land use planning tool is deployed in a complementary 
fashion.  This is accomplished through the adoption of a comprehensive land use planning model 
that is capable of adequately balancing market pressures in favor of development with the need 
to preserve valuable agricultural land.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Productive agricultural land is being developed and converted to suburban sprawl in 
every state in America at increasing rates.  This is not a problem that can be addressed in the 
future: a program capable of reversing the trend needs to be developed and implemented now.  
To date, no thoroughly comprehensive plan exists to effect the necessary change.  While the 
federal government and state and local governments have recently begun to address this problem, 
their respective efforts are not synchronized and have not been successful.  A comprehensive 
land use planning model capable of responding to the many variables inherent in land use 
planning is necessary.  This Article represents an attempt to lay the groundwork necessary for 
such a model.  Thus, this Article suggests a framework for the development of a comprehensive 
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land use planning strategy, a strategy that is flexible enough to adapt to the different composition 
of each state.  This model involves both the federal government and state and local governments, 
and attempts to coordinate their respective capacities in a manner that they complement one 
another.  It also provides an example of the manner in which a variety of land use planning tools
may be deployed in a complementary fashion.  By employing a wide variety of land use planning 
tools, this model allows each individual land use planning tool to play to its strengths while other 
tools account for its weaknesses.  In addition, this model accounts for the legal framework in 
which land use planning schemes operate, and should survive legal challenge if properly 
implemented.  By taking all of these factors into consideration, this Article lays the foundation 
for a comprehensive land use planning model capable of adequately balancing the competing 
interests between development and agricultural land preservation.  The development of such a 
model would prevent America’s productive agricultural land from being developed in a 
haphazard fashion while allowing necessary development to occur in an intelligent, organized 
manner.
